Korach 5785: Human Logic, Divine Truths

In Parshas Korach, the Torah teaches us about a rebellion against the leadership of Moshe and Aharon. The head of the rebels, Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehas ben Levi, was a first cousin to Moshe and Aharon, their fathers (Amram and Yitzhar) being brothers. Numerous Midrashic sources explain that Korach was jealous that Moshe took “malchus” (kingship) for himself (so Korach claimed) and that he appointed his brother to the Priesthood. Korach denied these appointments were Divine in nature, and claimed that Moshe was a despotic ruler.

Furthermore, when Moshe appointed his younger first cousin, by his youngest uncle, as the prince of the family of Kehas (Elitzafan ben Uziel) – also by the command of Hashem – for Korach, this was the final straw.

Full of jealousy, lust and the desire for honor – all terrible traits which the Sages caution us remove a person from the world (Pirkei Avos) – Korach convinces others to join with him in overthrowing Moshe and Aharon.

Using the tool of leitzanus, scoffing – one of the most debased and dangerous middos (Tehillim 1:1) – Korach mocks Moshe and tells the people that Moshe does not care about them, and he only cares about himself (see Rashi to 16:19). The sad irony is that Korach – who claimed to have the nation’s best interest in mind – truly does not care about the people and it is he who only cared about himself and the power and honor he desired.

In order to attempt to erroneously demonstrate that the Torah is non-sensical and absurd, chas v’shalom!, Korach and his followers dress in tunics made entirely of blue wool (techeles). Upon encountering Moshe, Korach mocks him and asks Moshe if a garment that is kulo techeles needs tzitzis (with its fringe of techeles) or not. When Moshe replies in the affirmative, Korach retorts: How is it possible that a garment entirely of techeles does not exempt itself from the requirement of tzitzis, but a string on the corner of a garment does? (Hence the juxtaposition of the end of last week’s parsha, Bamidbar 15:37-41, to the Korach rebellion). (Medrash Bamidbar Rabbah 18:3 records this incident of the blue tunics. It is also recorded in Medrash Tanchuma, Parshas Korach).

The Torah says that:

וְהָיָ֣ה לָכֶם֮ לְצִיצִת֒ וּרְאִיתֶ֣ם אֹת֗וֹ וּזְכַרְתֶּם֙ אֶת־כׇּל־מִצְוֺ֣ת הוַעֲשִׂיתֶ֖ם אֹתָ֑ם וְלֹֽא־תָת֜וּרוּ אַחֲרֵ֤י לְבַבְכֶם֙ וְאַחֲרֵ֣י עֵֽינֵיכֶ֔ם אֲשֶׁר־אַתֶּ֥ם זֹנִ֖ים אַחֲרֵיהֶֽם

And it will be for you for tzitzis, and you will see it, and you will remember all the mitzvos of Hashem and perform them, and you shall not stray after your hearts and after your eyes, which you stray after (15:39).

From here we understand that when we see the techeles we will remember all the mitzvos of Hashem and we will perform them. How – we may ask – will the seeing lead us to remembrance, and then to performance? Chazal explain:

היה רמאיר אומר מה נשתנה תכלת מכל מיני צבעונין מפני שהתכלת דומה לים וים דומה לרקיע ורקיע לכסא הכבוד

Rabi Meir (ba’as Ha’neis) said: What is unique about techeles more than all other colors? Because techeles resembles the sea, and the sea resembles the firmament and the firmament (resembles) the Throne of Glory (Menachos 43b).

What is Korach’s reasoning? If the purpose of the string of techeles is to see it and remember all the mitzvos of Hashem (15:39), then how is it possible that a garment entirely of blue wool is not a sufficient reminder and would still need the techeles on the tzitzis?

While according to human rationale, Korach may have been correct, we do not keep the Torah and mitzvos according to our rationale. We keep Torah and mitzvos because we entered into a binding covenant with Hashem at Har Sinai, and accepted upon ourselves that “all that G-d has spoken we will do and we will listen” (Shemos 24:7).

Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks z’l writes, “Korah’s argument is that there are other ways of remembering Heaven than by attaching a blue fringe to the corners of our clothes. Another is to make a garment entirely of blue – surely a far more visible, eye-catching symbol. Korah’s argument is logical but not rational. What he forgot is that the essence of the command is the means, not the end. It is precisely by doing things God’s way that we achieve personal transformation. The apprentice who is impatient with the instructions of the master will never grow, never become a master himself. Apprenticeship is a matter of doing things we do not fully understand until we have undergone that discipline of subordinating ourselves to the instructions of the expert. This is the meaning of mitzva, command. It is our apprenticeship to the Master of the universe. In telling us this, the Midrash is teaching us something deep not only about the nature of a mitzva, a commandment, but also about leadership itself. Korah could never be a leader because he was incapable of being a follower. He did not understand what it is to obey. Such a person will never get others to obey” (Covenant and Conversation Numbers, p.199).

We must remember that there are different categories of mitzvos that Hashem commanded us, and all of them elevate us through their performance. While there are some mitzvos we seem to understand the rationale for, and others which we do not, we can never use our logic and reasoning to explain why a mitzvah must be kept, why it ‘works’ and what it does for our neshama. From those we understand, to those we may not, they are all Divine in nature and we are servants of Hashem, here to do His will.

Korach and his followers were destroyed in a Heavenly act of justice. It was not only to remove them from the world, but to remind us that “Moshe is true and His Torah is true” (Medrash Bamidbar Rabbah 18:20).

It is only through following the mitzvos and halachos as prescribed by Torah that we can elevate ourselves and live lives of distinction, וְאַתֶּם תִּהְיוּלִי מַמְלֶכֶת כֹּהֲנִים, וְגוֹי קָדוֹשׁand then we will fulfill our mission as a kingdom of priests and a holy nation (Shemos 19:6).

בברכת בשורות טובות ושבת שלום,

Michal

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